

ACRONYMS

APP	Annual Performance Plan
CCA	Community Choice Approach
COS	Council of Stakeholders
CPA	Community Property Association
CRDP	Comprehensive Rural Development Programme
DCE	Discrete Choice Experiment
DRDLR	Department of Rural Development and Land Reform
FG	Focus Group
IDP	Integrated Development Plans
ISC	Interdepartmental Steering Committee
LED	Local Economic Development
MFMA	Municipal Finance Management Act
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
RD	Rural Development
RDM	Rural Development Model
WC	Western Cape
WCDoA	Western Cape Department of Agriculture
WCPG	Western Cape Provincial Government

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Summary of Policy Implications

In 2009, the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP) was launched to develop rural areas throughout South Africa. This report evaluates the institutional design, impact and implementation of the Rural Development Model (RDM) in three rural development nodes in the Western Cape and offers recommendations for improvements. The research revealed many positive emerging outcomes: improved community organisational life, a sense of a community voice, infrastructural changes (roadside paving, household water tanks, oxidation ponds and small reservoirs), economic opportunities (new emerging farmers, community initiated small-scale projects) social upliftment (free scholar transport, career guidance initiatives, access to the internet, drug addiction counselling etc.) RD nodes have many projects still in process that require COS stewardship. These successes should be recognised as collaborative projects complementing existing municipal services. The research found that the model has a number of strengths and coordination challenges. These relate to the complexity in effectively engaging multiple partners in a multiplicity rural development projects and include the extent to which individual departments prioritise rural development and dedicate time, money and resources to its implementation.

This evaluation suggests that national, provincial and local government first develop a set of feasible projects for which funding is pre-approved (much like a set menu based on a notional overall budget) for the ward for a specified period. Then, the next stage of a revised model of rural development should be based on a community choice approach (CCA), whereby communities select a few projects from a predetermined list of pre-approved projects rather than draw up a wish list. Project categories should include social upliftment, infrastructure and economic development. The uniqueness of the bottom-up input will still be reflected in the combination of projects communities select to bring to the Interdepartmental Steering Committee (ISC). Any special requests have to be negotiated. The CCA requires structured community participation and workshopping of options so that the COS and community are fully aware of the benefits attached to each choice that will be made for a four or five year planning cycle. The ISC and the COS should play a key role in facilitating the CCA process.

The government supported COS should ensure that communities remain informed about new projects, government gets feedback and that these projects are delivered in an equitable way to serve the broader community. The main purpose of ISC should be to coordinate a few strategic projects selected through the CCA process (and listed on the IDP). The ISC should include parties and work groups necessary to execute a discrete set of CCA priority projects. Time-frames need to be put in place and lead departments held to account. The municipal presence in ISC should be boosted since they are fundamental players in the process of rural

development. It is recommended that together with WCDoA, a senior municipal official co-chairs the ISC meeting and provides logistical and infrastructural support to COS.

Executive Summary

The mandate of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) is to develop rural areas throughout South Africa. In 2009, the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP) was launched as part of this objective. The CRDP is targeted at the poorest rural wards in the country and is being implemented in all provinces. In giving effect to this mandate, since 2010, the Western Cape Government, through the WCDoA, has developed its own Rural Development Model (RDM) to tackle poverty, food insecurity, unemployment, the lack of basic services and promote a well-structured and organised community in 16 of the poorest rural areas in the province. The RDM was first piloted in Dysseisdorp in 2010. To that extent, its aims are aligned to those of the CRDP, which include the need to reduce local and regional disparities and “to ensure meaningful community participation, leadership, and ownership in change efforts”. The National Planning Commission's *National Development Plan* (NPC 2011: 197) states that one million new jobs can be created in agriculture and related industries over the next two decades.

The Western Cape Provincial Strategic Plan defines rural development as a “multi-dimensional (broad based, human centred, economically focused) programme”. It further argues that delivery will not be successful without “strategically aligned projects through enhanced portfolio, programme and project coordination, with project management, sequencing and scheduling better coordinated.” Rural development, it argues, must be a “truly intergovernmental effort”.

The RDM's governance structure is comprised of an Interdepartmental Steering Committee (ISC), consisting of relevant national, provincial and local officials, and a community based Councils of Stakeholders (CoS) The ISC serves as a forum for engagement across the three spheres of government to identify, facilitate and prioritise potential development projects with the COS.

The WCDoA has deemed it appropriate to evaluate the effectiveness of the model. This report evaluates the emerging impacts, institutional design and implementation of the model in three rural development nodes in the Western Cape Province. It recommends structural improvements for achieving better outcomes in the future.

The methodology for the evaluation was based on a mixed methods approach which included a survey of fifty household heads in each of the selected wards, key informant interviews with national, provincial and local municipal officials, (25 in total) and focus group discussions with COS members in each rural node. The WCDoA

selected the wards. As much of the information gathered through the interviews was based on respondents' perceptions on how the RDM had been implemented in their locality, it was not always possible to confirm the truth or accuracy of their claims. Nevertheless, through a process of triangulation, it was possible to discern trends which corroborated the more contentious issues raised by respondents.

The evaluation found that the RDM has a number of strengths and a variety of coordination challenges. These relate to the complexity involved in effectively engaging multiple partners across many projects and include the extent to which individual government departments prioritise the RD priorities and dedicate time and resources to its implementation. This is aggravated by the fact that the time allocated for ISC meetings (typically four times a year for an average of three hours per meeting) is insufficient to address the interests of all participants (usually 20-30 people including representatives from around 8 or 9 departments attend). Therefore, complex issues frequently remain unresolved and progress in securing funding and in implementing projects is slow. Decision-making is constrained by the fact that the participation of departments in the ISC is often erratic.

The research across the three case study municipalities revealed a high-level of community awareness of the work of the COS (if not of the RDM itself) and an appreciation that some development was occurring in their locality. Examples of emerging outcomes are seen in community organisational life, a sense of a community voice, infrastructural change (roadside paving, slipway, household water tanks, oxidation ponds, small reservoirs), economic opportunities (new emerging farmers, community initiated small-scale projects) social upliftment (scholar transport, career guidance initiatives, driver's licences, access to the internet, drug addiction counselling etc.). These developmental projects complement municipal services, and are also listed in the IDP. COS leaders are well networked because they belong to local structures (such as, the Community Property Association, political parties, and civil society organisations).

The evaluation found that the COS structures confront a number of challenges. In the first instance, despite the dedication of their volunteer members, many COS are sometimes viewed as parallel and competing structures to the remunerated ward committees. Secondly, there is no means to guarantee that the projects, which they prioritise and forward to the ISC, will be funded and implemented. Thirdly, representation of the spectrum of stakeholders in the community is uneven.

The majority of interviewed government officials (85%) were overwhelmingly supportive of the COS. Notwithstanding the reservations of some officials interviewed, there was a general view that the RDM was being implemented in line with the objectives of the CRDP and that it was fulfilling a role in mobilising communities and

initiating development projects, which would not otherwise have occurred. RD nodes show an impressive number and range of completed projects (some simple, others complex and partial success stories) and many still in process that require COS stewardship. This success should be recognised. But in the light of the challenges noted above, it was felt that three years was too short a time frame to pronounce on the effectiveness of this promising model and therefore it is recommended that the RDM should have more time to evolve and adapt to the realities of different rural communities.

It is proposed that the RDM should be recognised as a vital intervention but be re-designed. In this proposed method, a limited schedule of pre-funded projects (based on a notional overall budget) is developed by government. Funding should be secured in the budgets of provincial departments, municipalities and the DRDLR and should be aligned to the IDP.

The second step is to present a set menu of prefunded project options to local communities during IDP engagements for their consideration. This community choice approach (CCA), whereby communities select a few priority projects from a predetermined list of fundable projects is recommended against the wish list approach. The CCA requires structured community participation that allows for workshopping of options so that the COS and community are aware of the implications and other benefits attached to each choice that will be made for a four or five year planning cycle. Once communities have made choices from the set menu, they would then have to subject these choices to a selection process that considers provincial wide priorities and budgets. On the first round, they may not get everything because all 16 nodal choices need to be evaluated.

The uniqueness of the bottom-up input will still be reflected in the combination of projects communities select to bring to the Interdepartmental Steering Committee (ISC). Any special requests have to be investigated and negotiated.

Departments are held accountable because they have pre-approved projects which are reflected in SLA agreements with their partners (WCDoA, municipality, the COS and ISC) and these are entered into the APPs and budgets. The RD projects should be formally finalised at a senior level by the three spheres of government. In that respect, it is recommended that municipalities should be assigned a central role in the RDM. This is necessary to ensure greater co-ownership and its long-term sustainability. Under such an arrangement, senior municipal officials currently attending ISC meetings would become co-chairs of the ISC, and the COS would be integrated into the municipality.

The RDM should define clearer mandates for the COS. In addition, a “summit” of all COS leaders should be held to increase comparative learning across municipalities and this could take place every three years with ISC support. DRDLR should assist in clarifying the role of the COS in the context of stronger cooperative intergovernmental relationships.

Main Report

1. Background

1.1 Rural development challenge

Rural transformation is a long-term process that also requires concerted, structured and enabling state and social action. Bernstein defines rural development as “a pattern of agrarian change” leading to diminished inequalities, more secure livelihoods, greater employment, and environmental sustainability (1992: 5). He notes that some forms of economic growth might increase inequality and thus “alternative” models of *development* might be needed. It is also recognised that many development issues are ill-defined and complex and therefore require coordination between different government departments at a time when departments are under pressure to focus on “core business activities” that are easy to manage and measure.

Recognising that a substantial proportion of South Africa's population continue to live in the rural areas, national Department of Rural Development and Land Reform launched the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP) in 2009. The CRDP targets the poorest wards across the country. Its basic principles include “the need to integrate strategies that focus on rural communities ... (and) the need to reduce local and regional disparities” as well as “(t)he need to ensure meaningful community participation, leadership, and ownership in change efforts” (DRDLR, 2009:11).¹ The stepping up of rural development in South Africa was one of the most important thrusts of the New Growth Path to address the structural challenges of economic and spatial inequalities in the country (Department of Economic Development, 2010).

The Western Cape's population grew by about 29% from 2001 to 2011, from 4.5-million to 5.8-million, and it is the country's fastest-growing province (Census 2011). Although the overall incidence of poverty in the Western Cape Province is lower than in most provinces, it includes areas of deep poverty in the rural areas. This may be attributed to a range of historical factors relating back to the spatial power relations of the

¹ All references in this report are listed in the Literature Review, appended.

Apartheid era, which have led to a high degree of unevenness in the Western Cape economy. Almost two-thirds (64%) of the provincial population is located within the City of Cape Town and a substantial proportion of the Province's income is generated in the metropolitan area.

The rural areas, in contrast, are characterised by scattered small settlements, where it is costlier to provide infrastructure and are challenged by deeply unequal economic and power relations. Due to South Africa's political history, the benefits of the agricultural system have been inequitably distributed for generations.

1.2 The Rural Development Model

In response to these multiple challenges, and in giving effect to the mandate imposed by the CRDP, the Western Cape Government, through the Western Cape Department of Agriculture (WCDoA), in 2010 developed its Rural Development Model (RDM). This RDM aimed to tackle poverty, food insecurity, unemployment, the lack of basic services and to create "a well-structured and organised community positioned to attract private investment" in selected nodes (WCDoA, 2016). Consonant with the goals of the CRDP, the model sought "meaningful community participation, leadership, and ownership in change efforts". The RDM is based on a phased approach aimed at mobilising communities at a rural ward level for the delivery of social services and the creation of opportunities for economic growth and job creation.

The Western Cape Government's RDM, as indicated, is derived from the CRDP formulated by the DRDLR. Although the CRDP proposed that provincial premiers should be the champions of the national programme (DRDLR; 2009:24), responsibility for implementation of the RDM has been devolved to the Western Cape Department of Agriculture (WCDoA) where it is located under its Programme 8 for Rural Development. The key policy priority of Programme 8 is to "initiate, plan and monitor development in specific rural areas (CRDP sites) across the three spheres of government in order to address needs that have been identified".

A pilot RDM was implemented in Dysselsdorp, near Oudtshoorn, in 2010, and since then the model has been progressively rolled out. In its initial conceptualisation it was intended that implementation of the model in a selected node would extend over a period of three years, after which time, it was anticipated, a measure of sustainability would have been achieved and Government support could be reduced. As the RDM has been operational for six years and the three-year development cycle has been exceeded in a number of localities, the WCDOA has deemed it an appropriate time

to conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of the model in fulfilling its objectives. The report, which follows, presents the findings of this evaluation.

2. Evaluation Scope and Methods

The terms of reference for the evaluation were as follows:

1. To conduct an assessment of the extent to which the implementation of the RDM has a) influenced rural development in three selected rural development nodes, and b) supported the implementation of the CRDP.
2. Based on the findings of this assessment, to provide recommendations on how, taking into consideration the interests of various stakeholders and concerns of accountability, the model might be improved to better respond to the rural development co-ordination function in the province.

In undertaking this exercise, attention was paid to the extent to which the implementation of the model has met the objectives of the CRDP and the manner in which various stakeholders have experienced it. It also looked at emerging pathways of change in the implementation of the programme, emerging outcomes and prospects for structural improvements that could lead to better outcomes in future.

2.1 Methodology

The research was conducted in a prioritized Rural Development ward in each of the three municipalities selected by the Western Cape Department of Agriculture, namely the City of Cape Town, Swellendam and Matzikama. The methodology was a mixed methods approach which included a small non-probability sample survey of households in each of the selected wards (average of 40 per ward), key informant interviews with national, provincial and municipal officials and local office bearers, (25 in total), and interviews and focus group discussions with COS members in each node. All data gathering instruments were approved by the department prior to their use in the field. Due to the sensitivity of the issues discussed, individuals interviewed were assured of anonymity in their responses and this commitment is adhered to in this report. For that reason, we used generic references in this report to substantiate our observations.

The information generated in the field was augmented by a review of various official documents, including documents from the National and Western Cape Governments, municipal IDPs, ISC meeting minutes etc. The analysis was also informed by a literature review of various aspects of the rural development dynamic both in the Western Cape and more broadly. We also drew on the literature on service delivery where community participation and choice was required as well as

literature on actor networks, intergovernmental relations and departmentalism. Literature on the urban bias of policy and power issues in agrarian relations was also researched. A literature review and detailed case study reports of the successes and challenges of the RDM in the three rural wards is appended.

It is important to note that information generated through the interviews is based on the perception of individuals and their interpretation of the events that had transpired in the implementation of the RD programme in their locality. It was, therefore, not always possible to confirm the truth or accuracy of their claims. Nevertheless, through a process of triangulation (in which different stakeholders were asked the same questions and reference was made to secondary published sources) it was possible to discern trends which corroborated or dispelled some of the more contentious issues raised by respondents.

2.2 Scope of the Investigation

The scope of the investigation was limited to three predominantly rural wards in the three selected municipalities. The first of these, Ward 2 in Matzikama Municipality (on the West Coast) has about 8 000 predominantly coloured, residents (or 12 % of total population in the municipality). It is a low-density ward consisting of four distinctive settlements, Doringbaai, Papendorp, Ebenhaezer and Lutzville West, each about 10km apart. Ebenhaezer has the largest successful land claim in the Western Cape. The median age is 29, only slightly higher than the Western Cape's 28 but like Suurbraak there are proportionately fewer youth between the ages of 20-29 (Census 2011).

The second study area, Suurbraak, Ward 3 in Swellendam, has a population of about 8 000 people spread over a wide area with density of roughly five persons per square km. The ward consists of three geographically separated villages, Suurbraak, Buffelsjag and Malgas/Infanta, again, approximately 10km apart. The Swellendam municipality had a population of 35 000 in 2011 (estimated at 40 000 in 2016), with the ward comprising about 22% of the total population. Reflective of poverty levels in the ward the average annual household income is R30 000 (which is about half the level for the province). Median age in ward 3 is 30 (2 years more than the Western Cape average). About 77% of the population is coloured, 15% is white and 7% is African. Most of the economically active population work on farms and in agricultural packing facilities as seasonal workers (Census 2011).

The third study area, Ward 29, in the City of Cape Town, comprises parts of Atlantis together with the residential areas of Mamre and Pella. Pella is the smallest of the three settlements, both in population and geographic size, whilst Atlantis is the largest.

In 2011 the population of Ward 29 was 43 269 (an increase of 28% since 2001). Ward 29 contains less than 2% of CCT population of close to 3, 8 million. The median age of 26 indicates a much younger population than Suurbraak/ward 3 and Matzikama/ward 2 (Census 2011). The 2011 census indicated the population of Mamre to be 9 048 while Pella had a population of 1 681. Given the nature of the urban/industrial Atlantis, the research focused on peri-urban areas of Mamre and Pella at the household level but included Atlantis in all other levels of engagement.

3. Institutional architecture and assumptions of the Rural Development Model

3.1 Governance and leadership

The RDM's governance structure comprises an Interdepartmental Steering Committee (ISC) and COS. The ISC constitutes the coordinating/reporting structure of the model and typically includes (or is intended to include) the municipality and provincial departments of Economic Development and Tourism, Social Development, Arts and Culture, Health, Education, Public Works and Transport, Rural Development and Land Reform, the Western Cape Department of Agriculture, the private sector and Councils of Stakeholders (COS). The latter comprises representatives of all sectors (business, youth, religious and so on) in a community, including ward committee members. Its role is primarily, but not exclusively to approve and coordinate nodal projects.

An ISC in each RD locality is chaired by a Deputy Director of the Western Cape's Rural Development Programme. The main activity to be coordinated in the ISC is the "collective flow of resources to implement projects in the rural node to create socio-economic opportunities for the communities" (WCDoA 2016: 221). Since the programme is a "joint project between the three spheres of government", it is intended that "financial contributions *will be made by all departments involved depending on the nature of the projects*" (WCDoA, Rural Nodal Development Model, 2011).

3.2 Theory of Change and Assumptions of the Programme

The theory behind the RDM is based on setting up of an ISC, followed by a social facilitation process, which entails: a household profiling survey, the establishment of four work streams, and the institutionalisation of a COS. In terms of its original three-year sequential design, after the survey and social facilitation phase, comes the social upliftment phase (skills and social projects), infrastructural development (roads,

water, housing) and, finally, economic development phase (businesses, co-ops and job creation).

The COS comprises representatives of all sectors in a community, including ward committee members. It is a forum for engaging the all spheres of government to identify and prioritize potential development projects. High priority projects that are selected and approved by the COS are referred to appropriate government departments for funding and implementation (WCDoA, Updated Version Rural Development Model, No date: 6).

Each phase would be supported by a "work stream" made up of relevant departments and community members linked to the COS. It was hoped that the private sector would be more willing to invest in rural nodes once the phases were completed. The logic in brief was that "a well-structured and organised community" would be "positioned to attract private investment" in selected nodes (WCDoA, 2016).

Operating at the ward level, the approach is intended to be a bottom-up one with the community representatives (COS) providing input to ensure that real community needs are articulated. In the first stage, a detailed household profiling exercise is carried out in targeted rural development sites to ensure that government's interventions are also based on accurate information and poor households are targeted. This represents the model's 'theory of change'.

The establishment of COS as the representatives of communities is based on a number of assumptions, which entail risks that have been identified in this report and other studies. The first assumption relates to the concept of community which, as pointed out in the literature, is difficult to define, means different things to different people in different contexts, is inherently unstable, and takes a long time to cohere (Bozzoli, 1987). Community expectations, protests, cultural and political conflicts and the possibility that more powerful social groups may capture civic structures also make for higher risks of the fragmentation and de-legitimisation of COS structures (see Impact Economix 2015).

A second assumption in the RDM is that communities in poor wards are sufficiently homogenous to permit interest aggregation into discrete stakeholder groups at the *ward level*. However, the evaluation found that households in most communities identify with their historical village rather than with a politico-geographical structure such as a ward or interest groups (as was evident in Ebenhaezer, Doringbaai, and Pella amongst other localities).

A third assumption is that combining a bottom up (the community leaders) and top down (government officials) approach to RD would proceed un-problematically in a

relatively short time frame. However, it is evident that for such a process to succeed a considerably longer learning process is required and it is by no means guaranteed that conducting short training programmes for COS will lead to compliance with the administrative processes, which have been prescribed.

A fourth assumption of the RDM is the existence of the kind of intergovernmental relations necessary to ensure effective implementation of RD. The recent Western Cape Provincial Government (WCPG, Provincial Strategic Plan 2014-2019) asserts that delivery will not be successful without "*strategically aligned projects* through enhanced project coordination, with project management, sequencing and scheduling to be better coordinated". Rural development, it states, must be a "truly intergovernmental effort" (WC Provincial Strategic Plan 2014-2019: 15-17. The Western Cape is "taking *huge steps* toward greater integrated development and service delivery" (ibid.).

3.3 Intergovernmental Relations

Notwithstanding the need for a multi-sectoral approach to rural development, inter-governmental relations and the idea of co-operative governance espoused in the Constitution, continues to present a challenge to all spheres of government. This is evident in the fact that the structures of legislation promote a risk averse approach to expenditure. Scholarship on the risks of "networked governance" (see Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004) lists a number of further challenges which leading agents have to be aware of. For example, if complexity is high and responsibility is unclear this will undermine multi-stakeholder projects. Secondly, relationship stability is critical for accountability and may be undermined by turnover in representation. Thirdly, a theory of multi-stakeholder change assumes goal congruence within the organisational structures.

4. Key Findings: Implementation and Emerging Outcomes in the Three Case Study Municipalities

This section of the report assesses the current status of RDM structures in the three case study municipalities, the extent to which they are working efficiently and emerging outcomes.

4.1 Council of stakeholders and households

Across all three municipalities, it was found that the COS, the foundational structure of the RDM, was functioning sub-optimally. Generally, the COSs have only partially

fulfilled the administrative, organisational and constitutional obligations prescribed for them. The problems include calling regular meetings, reporting to the ISC, representing the entire ward, relying on members' own resources and dealing with turnover of office bearers and the essentially voluntary nature of the work.

There was little evidence of coherent sectoral stakeholder groups in the villages and across the ward. As one COS official put it, "die groot gemors is die voorskrifte dat ons sektore moet het". In one case, the COS "combined meetings to solve the sectoral problem" (Suurbraak Minutes of Cos Report, For Sept 2015- March 2016). Attempts to call regular CRDP public meetings were largely unsuccessful, although CRDP issues were reported at other fora and community meetings (Suurbraak Minutes of COS Report, For Sept 2015- March 2016). Explanations offered by COS members varied from: "people attend the CPA meetings, but not COS", to "people only attend meetings when the word housing is used", to "people attended before, but have lost faith now" (see FG reports and Case Studies). AGMs, as mandated in the COS constitution, were postponed in all three wards (see ISC Minutes, FG reports).

Each village has its own sub-COS. With up to three sub-COS in a ward, they find it hard to constitute a single cohesive ward-level structure. Therefore, interactions with the ISC and external actors can become fragmented, most markedly so in Matzikama and Atlantis-Mamre. In this context, consideration might have to be given to assessing existing patterns of conflicts/cohesion in each community and to establish how to work with and around these tensions.

The majority of interviewed government officials (85%) were overwhelmingly supportive of the COS. A minority (three key government informants out of 25), however, believed that COS leaders had fundamentally misunderstood their role and were hindering progress and were very politicised having been given the "completely wrong idea of their role by national government" that exaggerated their powers (Interviews, government officials).

Notwithstanding these problems, COS leaders are well networked because they belong to local structures (such as the Community Property Association, political networks, and civil society organisations). Suurbraak COS, in particular has strong communication lines with municipal officials whereas Matzikama ward 2 has strong lines of communication with national departments and less so with the municipality (FG Reports and interviews).

Household interviews with heads of households (average age 50 years, 121 validated survey forms) showed that 44% of respondents had heard of the CRDP. When asked about hearing of the Council of Stakeholders 46% said "yes". This compares slightly less favourably to the long-standing ward committees: 51% of household heads knew of the ward committee. About 71% of respondents were aware of community

meetings to discuss development in the area. Ward 29 residents showed the highest level of awareness.

Table 1: Comparative data on community awareness of CRDP across wards (Number of definite responses)

Ward	2, Matzikama	3, Swellendam	29, Cape Town
Awareness of CRDP			
Yes	19	8	26
No	14	33	19
Awareness of COS			
Yes	19	10	27
No	15	31	19
Awareness of Community meetings			
Yes	23	24	36
No	11	17	7

While there is significant variation in community awareness between the three wards awareness within wards also differs. Buffelsjag households (in ward 3) for example, are less informed than Suurbraak where the main activity of COS takes place and this has skewed the numbers.

The research shows that 44% of households believed their “living conditions” had improved; while 30% said it has worsened because of limited economic opportunities. One in four (25%) interviewees participated in community programmes but 39% said government programmes improved their lives. Almost 67% said they were “satisfied

with their neighbourhood". Significantly, about 62% of all households mentioned *social problems* in the neighbourhood as the "most important" problem. There was some variation in this response with ward 2 saying that economic problems were more important. However, Atlantis (ward 29) identified social problems as the most pressing.

Overall, about 42% said they did not receive free municipal services and 18% services had been terminated for non-payment. Interestingly, the COS also raised complaints about municipal services at the ISC meetings and the RD officials could assist in channelling the service delivery discussions to the municipality. This is a valuable complementary role played by the ISC, perhaps unintended.

There are logistical problems with agri-workers sitting on the COS since farmers do not allow workers time off for meetings (FG reports). The business sector is not present. Women have more voice in Suurbraak, which is largely run by female representatives (Chair and secretary are female), whereas Matzikama is run by men. Women were also well represented on the COS in Mamre and Pella, however did not participate that much in the focus group discussions and only responded to questions when directly asked to do so. There is a danger that if the COS relies on only community members with resources (cars, money etc), the poorest of the poor might be marginalised.

In summary, COS are not government structures. The members are volunteers. The COS operates out of the goodwill and civic mindedness of a few community entrepreneurs who are active in churches, sports bodies, political parties, co-ops and CPAs. The community leaders are proud that they have many successful infrastructure projects and extensive training projects. They can also vigorously engage local government. In some ways, this has strengthened the sense of community voice and democratic culture. There is strong evidence of a desire to engage constructively and energetically with government in rural development.

Local leaders, however, tend to speak for highly localised interests of their village *not* the ward scale. Yet while a "village mind set" is strong, all local COS leaders expressed a desire to learn more about the regional economy and the comparative experiences of their peers in other COS. As one leader put it, "In the COS, we learn something new every day. We accept the sweet and sour of community and COS work. As long as there are projects, we have community interest" (FG Reports, 2016). Despite the teething problems, our findings about the COS were very positive.

4.2 Interdepartmental Steering Committee

The ISC is the coordinating/reporting structure of the model and the ISC minutes reveal that in the space of two hours, once every two months, an ISC with 20 and 25 representatives attending, is expected to deal with a long list of complex and demanding processes that cannot feasibly be done in the allocated time (Interviews government officials). The typical ISC meeting is unwieldy and ranges from discussing progress reports and troubleshooting on up to ten projects, managing the institutional and political complexity of intergovernmental relations and community demands and complaints, receiving and considering financial reports on projects, to managing various external and internal stakeholders including municipalities, potential investors and so on. (Note the Province has set four meetings per year as the 'target' to be met (WCDoA Consolidated Annual Performance Plan, 2015, 132).

The ISC thus has become a multi-purpose interface of communities, external stakeholders, municipalities and national and provincial government departments. Its emerging challenges can be categorised as problems relating to interdepartmental accountability, the perceived lack of progress and recurring issues discussed in meetings, the microscopic nature of many issues raised, and the conflation of managing details with taking important decisions in the ISC (Interviews, ISC government representatives and ISC Minutes). The ISC, as it currently functions, has become increasingly difficult to manage (Interviews WCDoA officials). All the above issues are compounded by policy and funding uncertainty and policy churning -- an endless stream of new headline grabbing policies -- in the rural development space.

Interdepartmental accountability and a perceived lack of commitment by departments to rural development: the ISC minutes and interviews reveal that there is a high turnover of representation from departments with junior representatives sent to meetings making for a lack of continuity and poor institutional memory and reflecting a lack of commitment and passivity from many departments. Moreover, the WCDoA is not able to enforce decisions of the ISC and ensure departments deliver on their commitments. Departments do not drive projects and much of the driving comes from RD (Interviews, government officials). The national DRDLR is struggling with project approval processes; too few staff are stretched over large distances and many projects, and staff face the demoralising fact of policy uncertainty (Interviews, government officials).

The perceived lack of progress and recurring issues discussed in meetings: the minutes of ISC, focus group reports and interviews with government reveal a gap between the expectations of stakeholders and the final projects delivered. However,

project lists reveal that despite these perceptions there has been a concerted effort in delivering completed projects. It is one of our findings that government officials working directly with communities sometimes underestimate the positive work that they do and their achievements given the scale of the inherited difficulties and the complexity of coordination. Despite the negative perceptions, significantly, several major successful completed projects were applauded by the COS (Reservoir R3 million and Oxidation Ponds R5,7 million). It was reported that plans for Ebenhaeser Irrigation had been approved and R80 million set aside. This confirmed the view of a key COS member who spoke of the "sweet and sour of rural development".

There are however, instances of recurring problems around projects that have been bounced between departments and in the end were deemed not feasible or could not be funded. For example, the "long-standing sports field issue for Doringbaai and Lutzville West and the working for fisheries project (see minutes of Matzikama ISC 2013, up to 21 October 2015; also July 2015 minutes). The sports field was one of the first community requests in Ward 2. There is a similar case with a request for soup kitchens (ward 2) and school hall in ward 3.

The conflation of managing details with taking important decisions in the ISC and the microscopic nature of many issues raised: this reflects a lack of clarity about the role of the ISC and its relationship to work streams, the role of the COS, project management, municipalities and departments. Concern was expressed that RD should be based on long-lasting projects and not quick-fix projects. Whilst the ISC is meant to perform high level coordination channelling resources to meet community needs, respondents and the minutes of ISC meetings reflect that are mired in discussion around unblocking projects that have refused funding (also see Ward 29 ISC minutes, 2 March 2016: 6 for a list of funding refusals) the feasibility of projects, new projects and new needs and dealing with chasing up tasks and a complaints forum and information sharing. It is also noticeable that too many micro-projects (that could be managed outside the ISC) are added to the project lists. In Suurbraak, for example, there was a tendency to discuss micro-problems of projects (from toy library to the scholar transport, to water problems, and problems of booking the community hall) rather than strategic issues.

In an attempt to manage problems, ISCs decided to have two sessions; a first session where government met on its own, and then a later session where all parties met. (In the Dysselsdorp evaluation by Impact Economix, 2015) there was a strong call for such separate meetings).

Policy uncertainty: compounding these issues, is the problem of policy uncertainty and a stream of new policies and programmes (policy churning). Government, as some key state informants argued (Interviews, government officials), rapidly changes

policy directives and programmes: e.g., co-ops, agri-parks and 'one household one hectare'. Officials themselves find it hard to keep up with rapid policy and programme change.

In this context, the work of the ISC is remarkable and needs to be recognised as an important learning and testing ground for intergovernmental relations. Despite the challenges of the RDM, there is much evidence of concrete change (completed multi-million rand projects), government commitment and intense community engagement and pressure from below – successes, which can be directly ascribed to the RDM.

4.3 The Municipality's role

The predominant view was that the "municipality is the key" to rural development. Municipal officials were generally positive although there were concerns about the COS structures having misunderstood their role. It was suggested that the RDM has much to commend (it "complements the IDP" and is a valuable learning experience for municipal officials bringing them "closer to the community". As one municipal official put it "they keep us on our toes" and make us accountable. Another municipal leader stated that COS members need to be encouraged as a next generation of leaders. Many informants believe COS to be champions of development.

From the minutes, we found that most issues seem to end on the doorstep of the WCDoA, and the municipality, who were most often requested to act or follow-up. Our research however, shows that municipalities and COS structures in particular have experienced tensions and misunderstandings. Most COS members would like to see a stronger link with municipalities.

The research, moreover, shows that municipalities have been consistently attending and contributing ideas, funds and suggestions in ISC meetings and on balance a robust but constructive relationship exists between the municipality and COS (see Minutes of ISC meetings and interviews).

In cases of major projects agreed to by the COS and ISC but that need municipal coordination (sports fields and infrastructure), the RDM encountered challenges.

Municipal officials suggest the COS needs to be redesigned at the level of village structures and street committees also linked to ward committees.

4.4 Stages in the RDM, Roles, Funding and Responsibility

Were the 'RDM stages' followed as per the theory of change described previously?

A staged approach existed only in theory. It broke down for several systemic reasons: 1) because of unanticipated delays in phase one with receiving the household needs assessment survey results (a coordination issue); 2) work stream meetings either failed to quorate or were poorly attended because stakeholder sectors broke down (an institutional issue); 3) each village wanted its own COS (a fragmentation issue); 4) there were logistical problems in completing a growing list of prescribed tasks and micro-projects on time and 5) funding for wish-list projects was not approved (see Suurbraak ISC meetings 29 April 2015: 8; 25 February 2015: 3, 8).

Noticeable in the phased programme was the marginal presence of the business sector except for a few large projects in Doringbaai and proposed mentorship schemes for berry farms in Suurbraak. The big challenge was the absence of ring-fenced funding for rural projects in departments (Interviews WCDoA). The theory of change implicit in the model needs to take greater cognisance of difficulties inherent in intergovernmental exercises in particularly when budgets are under pressure as well as established vested economic/spatial interests (also see WCG 2015).

In terms of responsibilities, several departments missed meetings, others changed their delegates (see Minutes of ISC meetings) and it was claimed that sometimes very junior officials were sent to ISC meetings (Interviews with RD). This resulted in writing complaint letters to departments about poor attendance (FG Report; for example, see ISC Minutes, Suurbraak, 16/9/2015: 2).

A second issue is related to the roles of players. The COS did not see itself as tied to the local but above the local (FG Report and interviews). The role of the COS according to the DRDLR and as understood by the COS members seemed different from how other players saw them. Municipalities saw the COS as “punching above their weight” in ISC and in the ward. As one informant put it, “The national government flew the COS members to Johannesburg and the Minister told them you are the decision makers in the wards... So the complete wrong message was given to them. They came back and we struggled to get projects off the ground so much so that one of the projects is still not off the ground”. In some ways, the COS is seen as a parallel structure to local government's ward structures. Role confusion and not fulfilling tasks on time, as envisaged in the stages, contributed to delays.

There were explicit benchmarks and milestones for the ISC and COS operations. Targets such as having four ISC meetings were fully met (ISC minutes). This has been captured in Annual Performance Plans and Quarterly Performance Reporting. Outputs such as training have also been captured. The fact that many projects were completed is a major strength.

4.5 Coordination and different values among actors in the Model

"If this silo approach is not transformed effectively it could stop or delay the momentum of development in the identified rural communities. The aforementioned is addressed by institutionalising the participation arrangement with the different spheres of government (e.g. incorporation of participation into the Performance Agreements of Departments' and entering into agreements with the various municipalities by means of a commitment letter)." (WCDoA 2015: 225)

A number of challenges emerged in the interviews and focus groups. A strong theme highlighted among RD officials was the 'silo' or 'departmentalism' problem, which in turn speaks to coordination/accountability challenges. Silos and risk aversion behaviours may limit possibilities for closer inter-departmental coordination in the RDM. Commenting on this, Pieterse (2009, p. 12) asserts:

"This risk avoidance impulse has been reinforced by two pieces of legislation that aim to prevent corruption and ensure transparency in public finance accounting: the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA). Both of these pieces of legislation reinforce a narrow accounting mindset. ... all urban development and sectoral policies insist on holistic approaches but the public finance system comes very close to criminalising joint programmes. Unless this fundamental institutional dynamic is unravelled, it is unlikely that we can envisage more effective policy outcomes."

However, several different categories of reasons were offered for the perceived lack of success of coordination in RDM. Importantly, not all government respondents mentioned silos as *the* primary reason for the coordination problem. There was recognition that intergovernmental cooperation was essential yet beset by problems of both an objective nature (capacity, understood as the ability and authority to get things done) and of a subjective nature. Objective capacity factors included: lack of resources (at an extreme, no car available) and people (senior staff overstretched because they have to cover all nodes in the whole province); unfunded mandates, poor government reporting structures, the overly decentralised nature of RDM with too many sites and too many meetings. And, finally, some officials mentioned the problem of the ward as an inappropriate scale for planning.

Subjective issues included: meetings are sometimes fractious and politicised; the same issues recur; the high turnover of representatives attending meetings; and community representatives do not understand their role vis-a-vis government. Different departments have different understandings about what should be done for rural areas and for rural people. Within a single department or agency, we also found sharply different individual views about who should lead rural development. For example, at least two informants felt the business sector should lead rural development.

The view (from a few provincial government respondents) was that economic activity by its nature dictates agglomeration and economies of scale: "It is just not sensible to develop small residential towns. People have to move to larger towns where there is infrastructure". In this view, there is little value in promoting the growth in population of villages, as all this does is create more demand for services (Interviews, government officials). The absence of shared views about the value of rural development may become problematic from an intergovernmental perspective.

Government respondents in the interviews emphasised that policy churning contributed to community scepticism, funding delays and planning uncertainty. Interviewees were concerned that the CRDP was a national programme, but national government seems to no longer fund the CRDP and is focusing on Agriparks. For example, a senior provincial official felt that "Agri-parks have now taken over, but province is still committed to the CRDP". We must, he argued, "steer clear of policy overkill ... communities don't care about government policy changing or not ... and, we as province should only go to communities with proper ideas". We found this to be a key insight.

Officials also critically noted that it takes too long to respond to requests for funding and communities are left hanging. Informants provided contrasting accounts of the coordination issues affecting RDM. One national government informant noted,

"It is the long time it takes to approve project funding because a proposal from ISC needs to go through several levels of the bureaucracy. Government bureaucracy can be just demoralising" (Interview, government official).

In summary, there is a view among key officials co-ordinating the RDM that the key challenge of the RDM is that departments have not ring-fenced funds for rural development and that their commitment and representation in the RDM is uncertain and residual. As one official noted,

"They cannot commit because they are not decision makers, junior people and interns come to ISC and now that pressure is put on them to report they stay away. The biggest challenge is the lack of ring-fenced budgeted money for the 16 nodes. Usually it is when money is left over so rural development becomes an add-on. We sent letters to departments to HODs and asking for regular attendance of managed people. It is not a priority for them".

An interesting finding was that the majority of officials felt that "values matter" and "we cannot abandon rural areas". The rural areas should not be seen as residual to urban. Most informants were very emphatic that the current RDM has numerous benefits in terms of tangible deliverables, building an 'entrepreneurial activist' culture under very challenging circumstances. Our interviews show that government officials across all three spheres appreciate the opportunities the RDM provides to learn how

to listen, patiently engage and respect local communities and their leaders. Learning was taking place on both sides. However, the issues raised and the positive engagements and interventions will need to be taken further by government alongside its community partners.

4.6 Emerging Outcomes: All of government presence and Projects

“We checked with other departments to find out what they are doing in nodes... Communities and civil society can see that several departments do have activities ... libraries, housing, roads etc. This is the all of government presence we want to see“ (Interview, senior government official).

There is visible evidence of multi-dimensional change: 1) organisational (there is a community voice); 2) infrastructural (roadside paving, slipway, household water tanks, oxidation ponds, small reservoirs); 3) economic (new emerging farmers, community initiated small-scale projects and co-ops, grain co-ops); and 4) social upliftment (scholar transport, driver's licences, access to internet, drug addiction counselling etc.). These developmental projects complement the municipal services, are very important and are recognised in the Municipality, in the IDP and by the community (see household survey). The table below provides a categorisation of projects and their progress by ward. Matzikama has the most completed social and infrastructure projects.

Table 2: Rural Development Projects

Ward	Project Category	No of Projects	Completed	In process
Matzikama, ward 2	Social Facilitation	1	1	0
	Social Upliftment	30	18	12
	Infrastructure Development	13	12	1
	Economic Development	5	1	4
Swellendam, ward 3	Social Facilitation	2	1	1
	Social Upliftment	9	8	1
	Infrastructure Development	16	4	12
City of Cape Town, ward 29	Economic Development	10	8	2
	Social Facilitation	2	1	1
	Social Upliftment	15	8	7
	Infrastructure Development	10	9	1
	Economic Development	10	0	10

Source: IDP's ISC Minutes, RD Project List 2016

As table 2 shows there are more than 50 projects still underway and others waiting for funding to be released. In Suurbraak, many micro-projects and a housing and major infrastructure project are under way. Here, the municipality plays an active role even though there are many complaints about the lack of an LED department in the municipality.

In Atlantis and Doringbaai the COS has recognised the catalytic power of large projects to make big impacts. However, some projects that disproportionately benefit only two or three people, have been reported as a concern in the COS (FG Interviews). The social upliftment projects in the form of household gardens seem to have limited sustainability. The infrastructure projects like the resurfacing of roads, paving and the improvement to community facilities did have broader community, aesthetic and safety benefits but levels of training and employment of locals was contested by COS. For example, the paving project in Matzikama was initially planned as a manufacturing co-op to produce pavers to pave the streets of the rural node. But the co-op aspect failed and paving was done by an outside firm. The precise reasons for this failure need further investigation. Although much effort was expended on setting up co-ops, they have collapsed for the most part.

Similarly, people were trained by RD, but then they had to leave their village to get jobs in town. Swellendam companies benefit because Suurbraak trainees would get jobs there. This, it was argued, defeats the goal of retaining skilled people in the villages. "Leaking" of benefits out of villages is a factor in assessing benefits of certain training schemes without linked local job opportunities (FG Reports, Suurbraak COS). However, not all RDM social training projects are directly job-related.

Another key outcome is related to governance. COS members remarked that they found that "government listens" to them and is responsive (FG Report). This is a major strength at a governance and developmental level. Despite not being able to have successful CRDP community meetings, the COS leadership have maintained public visibility, have interacted respectfully and positively with government. COS leaders are embedded in their communities (in the CPAs, entrepreneurial networks, micro projects, political networks), and value their reputations in these tightly knit communities. COS plays a very "useful" role (Interviews with government officials).

Councils of Stakeholders and ward committees are very different structures articulated with different levels of the intergovernmental system. They should not be conflated. The one is a voluntary community structure that has a contingent link with three spheres of government, whereas ward committees are legislated structures linked to solely to the municipality.

On balance, the research found that the role players in RDM at all levels had shown remarkable determination and flexibility. Thus, most key provincial and municipal

informants stated that it would be a big mistake to allow the COS structure to dissolve (Interviews, government officials). However, given the complexity of the RDM there are many risks that need to be avoided in a future improved model.

ISCs have been a laboratory for interdepartmental, intergovernmental, and state-society engagement. The people involved have shown resilience and staying power despite many support structures such as work streams not fully functioning in many cases. There is much room for improvement but the lessons are being learnt and need to be consolidated into a restructured programme with a modified approach. "I have a lot of respect for this RD work", commented one senior government official. There is no doubt that the ISC and chairpersons have had a formidable task (as a reading of the minutes of ISC meetings shows).

RD nodes show an impressive number and range of completed projects (some simple, others complex and partial success stories) and many still in process that require COS stewardship. This success should be recognised.

5. Recommendations

This study recommends a number of interlinked structural improvements in the RDM for achieving better outcomes in the future. The recommendations are derived from the research findings and the literature review. They are premised on an incremental view of policy-making and development. Historically the literature has been divided between what has been termed the 'comprehensive rational model' and the 'incremental model' of policy design and implementation that allows for flexibility and formative learning. The researchers favoured the latter approach, while recognising the need for long range comprehensive planning for rural development.

The scholarly literature (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004) on intergovernmental relations also notes that fragmented coordination and lack of accountability arises when complexity is high, and responsibility is unclear. There is often an accountability vacuum in networked governance. Relationship stability – i.e., who represents stakeholders and turnover in representation are key issues along with questions such as who should be a more stable anchor and driver for programmes.

Moreover, our recommendations follow on from those made by the Dysseisdorp Report (Economix, 2015). This assessment of Dysseisdorp raised two points about the way the RDM is set up (sequencing and the time frames). The current evaluation broadly endorses the following points made by Economix:

"The overall time-frame for focused government support in any cycle should be extended from 3 years to 5 years or more in order for the impacts (especially economic development) on the community to be fully realised".

Second, we endorse but take further the idea that government should to *start budgeting as early as possible* in the process to allow for the quicker implementation of economic development projects. This evaluation proposes an institutional approach for moving forward with greater certainty about funding and for a more focused RDM. It proposes uncluttering the processes to make more sustainable gains with fewer but better projects, delivered in a shorter time.

The recommended changes to the existing model are largely structural and thus should be understood as a package. A few secondary recommendations have been included to reinforce the suggested structural changes and as such, these are not absolute requirements.

An essential and rational pre-condition, *before* any development intervention is considered, is to establish exactly how much programme funding is available and whether this can be ring-fenced for each nodal ward. Secondly, it is necessary to establish the kind of projects the government can deliver to rural nodes in a specific period given available finances, its coordination capacity and existing knowledge about specific local needs and preferences in each node.

The findings of this evaluation suggest that the RD approach to project selection should in the first instance, be based on a limited choice approach. Following this approach, a predetermined list of fundable projects will be presented to local communities for consideration (we have called this a set menu or community choice approach (CCA). In such a revised model, communities select from a number of fundable, feasible projects rather than draw up a wish list. This approach flows directly from our findings and assessment of the risks facing the RDM. It is also further motivated in the literature review (appended and see De Shazo 2002, Honda et al 2015). The demonstration effect of having fewer but better synergistic, catalytic projects that also provide jobs will build community confidence that changes are happening more sustainably.

The community choice approach (set menu) presumes that communities are reasonable and their leaders understand that publicly provided service delivery systems have limited resources and not everything can be provided at once. Our findings suggest they prepared to tolerate some challenges and delays in the short term, provided they are convinced that some priorities are being sorted out and delivery will follow at a future date. More specifically, a well-conducted community choice process could have a wider citizenship building function.

- Which set menu projects will have the greatest impact for the community as a whole (for example a community hall)?
- What features of a project are most important in promoting greater cohesion, jobs and dignity in rural wards?

The conducting of a “power analysis” in a ward prior to the establishment of projects needs to form part of the community choice approach to avoid biased selection and ensure the poor benefit. This would entail a determination of the key interest groups in a community, conflicts of interest and their potential to support or obstruct broad-based development interventions and bias community choices. The COS Focus Groups reports provide indicators of these problems.

To address the silo problem, discussed previously, it has been suggested that provincial government “institutionalise the participation arrangement with the different spheres of government” (WCDoA 2015: 225). The effective use of the Provincial Transversal Management system linked to the Provincial Strategic Goal on Integrated Planning and Spatial Targeting is another lever for bringing this together. But these mechanisms are seen by *government as non-punitive* instruments, and “intrinsically linked to the roll that provincial and national government have with regard to supporting *municipalities* with the implementation of their municipal spatial planning and land use planning functions” (WCG, 2015).

But some scholars suggest that alongside such formal efforts at ‘joined-up’ government there are also less formal spaces for policy coalitions and actor networks composed of officials across different levels of the state and civil society actors who find common ground for policies to cohere (see Keely and Scoones, 2014). In this context, actor networks could involve strategic alliances between government officials and community organisers/leaders who jointly construct knowledge locally. Local projects could be put on display to demonstrate what is possible. For example, actor networks might establish their own knowledge of how a “community” works. Developing shared ways of seeing rural development is a key step in local knowledge (as opposed to statistics) to drive renewed rural development planning. The power of demonstrable “facts” needs to be emphasised and hence a network has to establish its own facts and “chains of persuasion” (Keeley and Scoones, 2007: 20). In other words, local communities, with the support of government officials, need themselves to work out what might feasibly be achieved in their own localities. Given these broad recommendations, a more pointed set of specific recommendations are listed below. These recommendations are interlinked and provide guidance about the logical steps that might be followed in a revised approach. Note that recommendations 15-17 are secondary recommendations.

Specific recommendations for a modified RDM are listed below):

- 1) Provincial departments and municipalities should develop a menu of feasible projects for which funding is ring-fenced and pre-approved based on a notional budget. This is step one for setting up a new node and restructuring existing project lists in existing nodes.

- 2) The second step is to present this menu to local communities and the COS. Communities then select a few priority projects from a predetermined list of fundable projects rather than draw up a wish list or continue of a long list of projects. This modified RDM, based on a community choice approach (CCA), does not ignore the uniqueness of the bottom-up input. This will still be reflected in the combination of projects communities select to bring to the ISC. Any special requests have to be investigated and negotiated. Any additional projects that might come from the private sector or micro-projects arising out of the COS at a later stage should be regarded as a bonus.
- 3) The CCA requires structured community participation and involvement based on extensive workshopping of choices and tradeoffs, so that the COS and community are fully aware of the implications and other benefits (such a jobs, training etc) attached to each choice that will be made in a specified planning cycle.
- 4) Once communities have made choices from the set menu known to the ISC, they would then have to subject these choices to a selection process that considers provincial wide priorities and budgets. On the first round, they may not get everything because all 16 nodal choices need to be evaluated by specific departments, municipalities and the province.
- 5) Departments are held accountable because they have pre-approved projects which are reflected in subsequent signed SLA agreements with their partners (The WC provincial government, WCDoA, municipality, the COS and ISC) and these are entered into the APPs and budgets.
- 6) All departmental Annual Performance Plans (APPs) must include a section on the Rural Development and on the programme in particular.
- 7) Developing shared ways of seeing rural development is a key step in renewed rural development planning. As part of building an 'all of government culture' in the RDM, an "actor network approach" should be also adopted in the model in order to erode departmentalism in government and to generate and share new knowledge about transversal government.
- 8) It is suggested that this could happen through a "learning network" which constructs its own "community of practice" in rural development at the local level. For example, organising RD roundtables, information sharing via internet, or conference with COS members from different areas to share successes.
- 9) The WCDoA should incrementally establish a link between the RDM and next phase of the CRDP namely Agri-parks, given that Agri-parks have national impetus and the province is still committed to the RDM.
- 10) Provide more staff for WCDoA (RD) to assist with the up-scaled activity and the time consuming demands entailed in facilitating community participation and building interdepartmental cooperation.

COS related recommendations

- 11) Flowing from the revised model, the COS should play a key role in facilitating the CCA process by aligning community needs with what local and provincial

- government has set as feasible, pre-approved projects such as social upliftment, training, infrastructure and economic development.
- 12) The COS is essential to ensure that communities remain informed about new projects and that these are delivered in an equitable and sustainable way not only to serve the broader community, but also to ensure that facilities are well maintained and utilised by the community.
 - 13) Local government and WCDoA should financially support the COS to ensure it not only represents a wide spectrum of society but especially the poorest of the poor. This support should be for participating and coordinating the CCA process and beyond this, to ensure these choices are presented to ISC and progress is monitored over the project cycle. COS should be assisted with media to report back to communities and to supplement public meetings.
 - 14) A political analysis should be conducted by the WCDoA to understand dynamics, hierarchies and conflicts of interest within a ward and between wards in order to better coordinate an informed approach to community upliftment , and an inclusive approach to rural development. This is especially important given the deep historical inequalities in rural areas.
 - 15) A secondary recommendation (stemming from COS FG) is for WCDoA to call a 'summit' of all COS leaders in the 16 nodes to increase comparative learning across municipalities (and elements of this evaluation shared with COS). DRDLR should be invited to assist in clarifying the role of the COS in the context of intergovernmental relationships and lessons learnt over the past few years.
 - 16) A COS team should do presentations to the provincial legislature on rural development challenges. This should elevate the status of COS in the province and allow for better communication, more trust and improved actor networks.
 - 17) COS should be allocated meeting space in the municipal building (also recommended in the Impact Economix, Dysselsdorp report, 2015). COS should also be formally recognised, and supported by the Mayor and the Speaker (who is usually in charge of public participation) on the understanding that they are complementing the ward committee system.
 - 18) A concerted effort must be made to ensure that agri-workers are included in COS meetings. Agri-workers can be assisted in obtaining services (referrals) via COS, municipalities and a local agri-workers support unit. In addition, women and small business should also be encouraged to participate.
 - 19) COS reports, meetings and public events could be published in the local newspaper, through a municipal newsletter or by pamphlet (as occasionally seems to have occurred in in Swellendam).

ISC related recommendations

- 20) The main purpose of ISC should be to coordinate a few strategic projects selected through the CCA process (and listed on the IDP).
- 21) The ISC should be streamlined and narrowly constituted only of government and community entities and work groups necessary to execute a discrete set

of CCA priority projects for a specific ward for a specific period. Time-frames need to be put in place and lead departments held to account.

- 22) It should meet independently of COS to deal with internal coordination issues based on the discrete set of projects. A coherent approach between relevant players in dealing with COS would make for a smoother, more accountable, and more fruitful process in the ISC meetings.
- 23) The municipal presence in ISC should be boosted since they are fundamental players in the process of rural development. It is recommended that together with WCDoA, a senior municipal official co-chairs the ISC meeting (for example, taking charge of agreed agenda items, possibly providing logistical and infrastructural support to COS and taking greater ownership).
- 24) ISC meetings should occasionally be held with mayors as well and in council chambers to reinforce the RDM-IDP connectedness. ISC meetings should also be held in the community, as has been the practice, since this has helped to bring discussions around development closer to these communities and for government to see what the rural communities are experiencing.